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Europe’s Cyprus blunder raises important questions about
the nature of EU decision-making and crisis management.
by Blog Admin
One week ago, the EU, IMF and European Central Bank agreed to a bailout for Cyprus that
would involve a levy on the country’s bank deposits. The terms of the bailout have been met
with surprise and fury in Cyprus and across Europe, and were also rejected by Cyprus’s
parliament. Nicholas Veron writes that no matter the outcome, the crisis is likely to cause
lasting damage to the trust of Eurozone households in the banking system, and to the EU’s
plans for banking union.
The late Mike Mussa of  the Peterson Institute, a f ormer Chief  Economist of  the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), noted about some episodes of  the late-1990s Asian f inancial turmoil
that “there are three types of  f inancial crises: crises of  liquidity, crises of  solvency, and crises of  stupidity.”
This quip comes to mind when considering the developments of  the past f ew days around Cyprus.
The March 16 announcement of  an agreement backed by most European leaders and institutions as well as
the IMF, which called f or a tax (or possibly an unf avorable cash-f or-equity swap) on holders of  bank
deposits, no matter how small, was a policy blunder that is likely to cost the European Union (EU) dearly.
The sequence that led to this “Saturday-morning plan” is well known. Greece’s sovereign debt restructuring
a year ago hit Cypriot banks that had bought Greek bonds, raising doubts about the Cypriot government’s
own solvency. Negotiations on a possible bailout by the EU had been seen as inevitable as early as mid-
2012. But discussions were f rozen until a general election in Cyprus last month. Unf ortunately, the delay
pushed the timetable of  negotiation into German election cycle territory, constraining the latitude of  the
euro group of  eurozone f inance ministers, in which Germany is now the unquestioned central actor. Driven
by the domestic German polit ical debate, European negotiators were intent on f orcing losses on large
(read Russia- linked) Cypriot deposits as an indispensable component of  the package.
To the surprise of  many, the recently elected Cypriot president, Nicos Anastasiades, added a f urther twist
to the tangled situation by suggesting a hit to small depositors as well. According to some reports, he
wanted to limit the losses imposed on large depositors in order to preserve the island’s f uture as an
international f inancial center. All negotiators seem to have accepted this of f er bef ore realizing, too late,
how damaging it might be to trust in the saf ety of  bank deposits well beyond Cyprus. No easy or painless
option was available f or Cyprus. However, some of  the Saturday-morning plan’s f laws were avoidable.
First, the plan disregarded the lessons of  f inancial history about the high importance of  deposit saf ety,
particularly f or middle-class households (which is why there usually is an upper limit f or explicit deposit
insurance, harmonized at € 100,000 in the EU since 2009). Based on the experience of  the early 1930s, it is
virtually undisputed in the US that a breach of  deposit insurance will primarily hurt the “litt le guys.” Sheila
Bair, the respected f ormer Chairman of  the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has expressed this
view with ref erence to Cyprus. Similar lessons arise f rom the record of  many recent emerging-market
crises.
If  it is true, as alleged, that Cyprus’s own president was the one who recommended hurting small
depositors, European negotiators were not justif ied in going along. Af ter all, in November 2010 the Troika
of  the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF rebuf f ed the Irish authorit ies’ proposal to “burn”
the holders of  senior unsecured debt in f ailed banks. Their concern was to prevent damaging contagion in
the rest of  Europe. A similar argument was more straightf orward and sensible f or Cyprus than it had been
f or Ireland, and should have led them to oppose Mr Anastasiades’ proposal f rom the outset.
Second, the f estival of  f inger-pointing in Brussels and across Europe f ollowing the Cyprus debacle shows
that the negotiators had no “plan B” were the Cypriot Parliament to reject their init ial scheme. One must
wonder whether the EU is ready to handle the complex Russian side of  the Cypriot equation, including the
wisdom of  depending on Russian goodwill f or a solution to the current mess.
Third, the Saturday-morning plan raised prof ound questions about the democratic nature of  EU decision-
making. The problem is not that hard measures were to be imposed on the Cypriot population. A loss of
autonomy, alas, is the inevitable consequence of  the Cypriot state’s inability to meet all its commitments on
its own, as Mr. Anastasiades had earlier acknowledged. Moreover, Cyprus has earned no sympathy by
rejecting the United Nations plan f or the island’s reunif ication ahead of  its entry into the EU in 2004, and
f or harboring Russian and Russian- linked f inancial activit ies widely presumed to be connected with money-
laundering.
The problem, rather, lies in the extent to which the European crisis management is now being held hostage
by German electoral polit ics. This dynamic is not new in the euro-crisis, but has reached new heights as
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s main opposition, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), has identif ied Cyprus earlier
this year as a “wedge issue” on which it could challenge her. The SPD calculation was to paint Ms. Merkel as
too lenient with shady Russian oligarchs and their “black money” held in Cypriot banks, while she would
presumably be prevented f rom responding because of  a f ear of  destabilizing Europe’s f inancial system. In
ef f ect, Ms. Merkel called the SPD’s bluf f  by risking the euro zone’s f irst bank run. No wonder that placards
on Nicosia’s streets carry slogans such as “Europe is f or its people and not f or Germany,” or that
Athanasios Orphanides, until recently the governor of  the Cypriot central bank and a member of  the
European Central Bank (ECB)’s Governing Council, complains that “some European governments are
essentially taking actions that are telling cit izens of  other member states that they are not equal under the
law.”
It is too early to evaluate the lasting damage, but it is likely to be signif icant. The Saturday-morning
decision-making process leaves an impression of  incompetence and groupthink, tainting all of  the
participating actors, including all euro zone f inance ministers, the European Commission, the ECB, and the
IMF. The EU’s earlier sense of  purpose by committing to a banking union last June and delivering on its f irst
step (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) in December has now been battered. So has the aura of
statesmanship and control developed by Ms. Merkel and the ECB. Possibly most damaging, even if  the
deposit tax is reversed or adjusted, the trust of  middle-class households throughout the Eurozone in the
saf ety of  their banking system has eroded. Hopef ully there will be no immediate deposit f light in other
countries than Cyprus. But in f uture crisis episodes, households will behave in a destabilizing way,
assuming Europe’s deposit insurance arrangements are not prof oundly ref ormed. There is an apt parallel
with the Deauville declaration by Ms. Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, endorsing losses f or
Greek sovereign bondholders in October 2010, which started an 18-months cycle of  increasingly negative
market expectations throughout Europe.
What now? A week ago, the challenge in Cyprus was to close the f iscal gap with a bailout package. Now it is
to close the f iscal gap, and to restore a minimal level of  trust in the banking system, without which the
economy cannot operate. This raises the bar. The obvious risk is of  massive deposit withdrawals whenever
the Cypriot banks reopen. Now that the seal on deposit saf ety has been broken, depositors will do their
best to avoid additional taxation or expropriation in a f ew weeks’ or months’ t ime, no matter how many
promises are made that this is a unique and once-and-f or-all occurrence. Cypriot authorit ies are likely to
address this with a mix of  capital controls and deposit f reeze, perhaps in the f orm of  conversion of
deposits to interest-bearing certif icates of  deposits, as recently proposed by Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati.
But “f inancial repression” or even incarceration can only last f or a limited period of  t ime given the f reedoms
guaranteed by the EU treaty.
Unlike in previous euro-crisis episodes, there is lit t le the ECB can do alone. The problem is f iscal at the
core and must be addressed by elected leaders. They may conclude that it is best to let Cyprus def ault,
impose capital controls and leave the euro zone, an option that was reported to be explicit ly considered in
European policy circles. But such a move would violate the promise of  European leaders to ensure the
integrity of  the euro zone, no matter what, and potentially set of f  a chain reaction, including possible bank
runs in other euro zone member states, starting with the most f ragile ones, such as Slovenia and of
course Greece.
On the other hand, it is dif f icult to see how the risky scenario of  a Cyprus exit could be avoided without
f urther f iscal commitments by euro zone partners, including Germany. Their help could be in the f orm of
additional direct transf ers to Cyprus to plug the f iscal gap, or some f orm of  guarantee of  deposits that
would come f rom the European rather than the national level. A quick but imperf ect way to achieve the latter
would be f or a European entity, possibly the European Stability Mechanism, to provide an unconditional
guarantee f or a limited but suf f icient period of  t ime (say, 18 months) to all national deposit guarantee
schemes in the euro zone, up to the € 100,000 European limit. Such “deposit reinsurance” has been
rejected absolutely by European policymakers so f ar. It would constitute a major contingent f inancial
commitment, even though the trust-enhancing ef f ect would arguably result in an eventual net f iscal benef it
f or all. But it would be a powerf ul preemptive tool to make sure a scenario of  retail bank run contagion
does not materialize, and might also become the only option available to restore conf idence if  such a
scenario were to become reality.
Assuming that the current situation is somehow brought under control, longer term questions beckon,
beyond the geopolit ical considerations related to Cyprus and its neighborhood. The breach of  the deposit
guarantee, materialization of  the bank run threat, and probable consideration of  capital controls will cast
the euro zone debate on banking union in a new and starker light. Since mid-2012 and until now, the policy
consensus in Europe had been to pretend that the question of  supranational deposit insurance, with its
direct links to the currently- f rozen issue of  f iscal union, was important but not urgent, and should be lef t
out of  the explicit banking union agenda. This convenient stance will be harder to hold given the Cypriot
experience. More broadly, the episode will contribute to an overdue debate about the democratic (or
otherwise) nature of  European decision-making and the ef f ectiveness of  its crisis management, two
challenges more tightly connected than many observers realized. A f irst step might be to recognize the plan
of  March 16 as a mistake, and to have an honest debate about how it could have been avoided.
Many commentators are puzzled by the general lack of  negative f inancial market reaction to the f ast-
unf olding events in Cyprus. The most likely reason, to be tested in the next f ew days, is that investors
have been suf f iciently impressed by last year ’s whatever- it- takes commitments, particularly those by Ms.
Merkel and ECB President Mario Draghi. The markets’ baseline assumption remains that a last-minute
solution will be f ound af ter all the brinkmanship. Longstanding observers of  the Eastern Mediterranean
tend to project a darker mood, as they recall that this is a region in which individuals, groups and nations do
not always act in their self - interest. One can only hope that the market’s assessment is the correct one.
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